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1  | INTRODUC TION
Perry Hendricks’ new ‘impairment argument’ against abortion aims to 
derive the wrongness of abortion from the wrongness of causing foe-
tal alcohol syndrome (FAS).1 According to Hendricks’ ‘impairment 
principle’, ‘if it is immoral to impair an organism O to the nth degree, 
then, ceteris paribus, it is immoral to impair O to the n+1 degree’.2 
Since death is a greater impairment than FAS, if causing FAS is wrong, 
so is obtaining an abortion, unless there is some relevant disanalogy 
between the two actions. Hendricks’ paper aims to show, in the words 
1 Hendricks, P. (2019). Even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral: The 
impairment argument. Bioethics, 33, 245–253.
2 Ibid: p. 247.
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Abstract
The ‘impairment argument’ against abortion developed by Perry Hendricks aims to 
derive the wrongness of abortion from the wrongness of causing foetal alcohol syn-
drome (FAS). Hendricks endorses an ‘impairment principle’, which states that, if it 
is wrong to inflict an impairment of a certain degree on an organism, then, ceteris 
paribus, it is also wrong to inflict a more severe impairment on that organism. Causing 
FAS is wrong in virtue of the impairment it inflicts. But abortion inflicts an even more 
severe impairment (death), and so, ceteris paribus, is also wrong. Notably, Hendricks 
thinks that this argument does not require the claim that the foetus is a person. Here, 
I respond to Hendricks by arguing that the ceteris paribus clause of the impairment 
principle is not met in ordinary cases of pregnancy. Carrying an unwanted pregnancy 
to term is much more burdensome than is refraining from excessive drinking for nine 
months. This provides a pro tanto justification for obtaining an abortion that does not 
apply to causing FAS. If the foetus is not a person, it seems fairly clear to me that this 
justification is strong enough to render abortion permissible. Hendricks is therefore 
incorrect in claiming that the impairment argument can go without claims concerning 
foetal personhood. If the foetus is a person, then whether burdensomeness justifies 
abortion depends on certain questions relating to Thomson’s famous violinist argu-
ment. I will not attempt to answer those. But anyone who is otherwise sympathetic 
to Thomson’s argument should not be moved by the impairment argument.
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of its title, that ‘even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral’. 
After all, the argument does not rely on any claims about foetal per-
sonhood. It instead relies on the claim that causing FAS is immoral, 
which will presumably be granted whatever one’s views on foetal 
personhood.
I agree that causing FAS is ordinarily wrong. Furthermore, 
Hendricks’ impairment principle seems plausible. Accordingly, I 
think the best bet for the pro-choice philosopher is to find some 
morally important difference between causing FAS in an ordinary 
case and obtaining an abortion, so that the ceteris paribus clause of 
the impairment principle is not satisfied. Here, I point out an import-
ant difference, which has not yet been entertained by either 
Hendricks or his critics.3 I note that carrying an unwanted pregnancy 
to term is typically far more burdensome than is abstaining from 
excessive drinking for nine months, and argue that this is a morally 
important difference. If the foetus is not a person, then I suggest 
that this burdensomeness is sufficient moral justification for having 
an abortion. Hendricks’ claim that the impairment argument against 
abortion can go without a commitment to foetal personhood there-
fore fails. If the foetus is a person, then whether this burdensome-
ness justifies having an abortion depends on how we answer certain 
questions related to Judith Jarvis Thomson’s (1971) famous argu-
ment for abortion’s permissibility.4 I will not attempt to answer 
those questions here, except for one in Section 3 that is directly 
relevant to my argument. But I do claim that anyone who is other-
wise sympathetic to something like Thomson’s argument should not 
be moved by the impairment argument, even if the foetus is a per-
son. The difference in burdensomeness provides an easy way of re-
sisting the inference to the wrongness of abortion by way of the 
impairment argument.
In the next section, I explain the line of response to the impair-
ment argument that I am defending. In Section 3, I explore whether 
the causing/allowing impairment distinction poses a problem for 
the argument of Section 2. In Section 4, I respond to a potential ob-
jection that asks about the mother’s obligations in an odd scenario 
where refraining from drinking really would be as burdensome as an 
unwanted pregnancy.
2  | BURDENSOMENESS,  DRINKING AND 
ABORTION
Judith Jarvis Thomson famously asks us to consider the following 
scenario.
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back 
in bed with an unconscious violinist… He has been found to 
have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers 
has canvassed all the available medical records and found 
that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have 
therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circu-
latory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys 
can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as 
your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, ‘Look, 
we're sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you—we 
would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, 
they did it, and the violinist is now plugged into you. To un-
plug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it's only for 
nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ail-
ment, and can safely be unplugged from you.’ Is it morally 
incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it 
would be very nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But 
do you have to accede to it?5
Thomson’s thought experiment is, of course, meant to illustrate 
the fact that it does not follow from someone’s being a person with a 
right to life that they also have a right to use your body in an invasive 
and taxing way to survive. Unplugging the violinist does not violate his 
right to life in the same way as, say, walking up to him on the street and 
shooting him.
Famously, many people agree that you are not obligated to remain 
plugged in.6 And even philosophers who think I might be obligated to 
remain plugged into the violinist7 will likely agree that, at least ordi-
narily, I would not be similarly obligated to remain plugged in if we 
replaced the violinist with a non-person organism (even if that organ-
ism will become a person later if I do stay plugged in).8 So if the case 
is otherwise analogous to abortion, and if we accept that unplugging 
from the violinist is permissible, then abortion is also permissible; if 
we accept the even more common judgment about the permissibility 
of unplugging from a non-person organism, and the case is otherwise 
analogous, it follows that abortion is permissible if the foetus is not a 
3 See, for example, Blackshaw, B. (2019). The impairment argument for the immorality of 
abortion: A reply. Bioethics, 33(6), 723–724.
4 Thomson, J. J. (1971). A defense of abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(1), 47–66.
5 Ibid: pp. 48–49.
6 This is in fact not obvious to me, which is part of my reason for being hesitant in the 
main text about whether Thomson’s argument works, on the assumption that the foetus 
is a person. While I agree that unplugging would not violate the violinist’s right against 
being killed, I think it might violate some welfare right that he has to my aid, even though 
aiding him would be very demanding for me. Of course, this does not imply that I should 
have a legal obligation not to unplug.
7 See, for example, Singer, P. (2011). Practical ethics (3rd ed.). Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 132–134; Fischer, J. M. (2013). Abortion and ownership. Journal of 
Ethics, 17(4), 275–304.
8 The arguments of Singer, op. cit., Chapter 6 imply that I would not be obligated to stay 
plugged into a non-person organism, even one that was a potential person. Given 
Singer’s utilitarianism, notice how his view shows that the view to which I am 
sympathetic—that it is clear that I could unplug from a non-person, but not clear that I 
could unplug from the violinist—does not depend on the claim that the interests of 
persons carry more moral weight than those of non-persons. It might instead be, as 
Singer thinks, that persons generally have stronger interests in survival than do 
non-persons, even as their equally weighty interests are equally morally important. 
Fischer, op. cit., pp. 290–291, in discussing Thomson’s people-seed case, argues that 
agreement with Thomson’s judgment regarding the case is often driven by illicitly 
thinking of the people-seeds as merely potential people, not, as they need to be for the 
case to do its intended work, as people. It is plausible that we may uproot merely 
potential people, but not full-fledged people. His argument requires that we reject 
Thomson’s judgment about the people-seed case. While he does not explicitly say so, 
this does suggest to me that he agrees that staying hooked up to a mere potential person 
would intuitively be too burdensome to be a moral requirement.
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person. Obviously, it is controversial whether the case is otherwise 
analogous to abortion. I will return to this later, but we can set it aside 
for now. The point I want to draw here is somewhat different.
Consider the following scenario.
Drinking while plugged in: I am plugged into the vio-
linist, as in Thomson’s case. I willingly consent to remain 
plugged into the violinist for the required nine months, 
and I do so. However, with an hour remaining, I down 
eight shots of liquor to celebrate the imminent unplug-
ging, knowing that some of the liquor will make it into the 
violinist’s body. This will cause him, in his compromised 
state, to develop a condition analogous to FAS. He sur-
vives, but with a severe cognitive impairment.
I obviously do something wrong by drinking in this case. 
Something about this may seem puzzling. After all, my actions 
were overall better for the violinist than what I was required to 
do, assuming that his condition still leaves him better off than he 
would be if he were dead. Most people think I could have permis-
sibly unplugged him and let him die, but I instead saved his life at 
significant cost to myself. Why would unplugging him be morally 
better than doing what I actually did?
I suggest that at least a large part of the difference between 
unplugging and drinking while plugged in is accounted for by 
what we can call the demandingness or burdensomeness of the 
two courses of action. There is a question about exactly what 
determines the demandingness of an action, and this will come 
up in Section 4. However, I take it that the intuitive idea is clear 
enough for now. It is a familiar thought that some actions—such 
as volunteering at a charity in my every spare moment—might be 
good, but are nonetheless supererogatory rather than required, 
precisely because they ask too much for them to be part of our 
moral duty.9
Staying hooked up to the violinist for nine months is extremely 
burdensome for me, and this provides me with a fairly strong justifi-
cation for unplugging. However, conditional on my bearing that cost, 
the further, marginal cost of putting the drinks off for an hour is triv-
ial. Accordingly, though I can give a fairly strong justification for un-
plugging, I cannot give such a justification for drinking, given that I 
am not unplugging. On this understanding, Thomson’s case and 
Drinking while plugged in are in an important way analogous to the 
following case from Derek Parfit:10
Suppose that I have three alternatives: 
A: at some great cost to myself, saving a stranger's right 
arm; 
B: doing nothing; 
C: at the same cost to myself, saving both the arms of 
this stranger.
Parfit suggests that, if the cost in question is great enough, (B) 
might be permissible even while performing (A) rather than (C) would 
be impermissible. After all, ‘If I am prepared to bear this cost, why do I 
not save both the stranger's arms?’ Or, as Jeff McMahan explains the 
point:
…if the agent decides to accept the cost, thereby exclud-
ing the option of doing nothing, his choice is then be-
tween providing a certain benefit and providing that 
same benefit and another equally great benefit at no ad-
ditional cost. While the agent has a good and sufficient 
reason to decline to prevent either harm, there is no rea-
son for him not to prevent the second harm if he is going 
to prevent the first. To prevent only the loss of one of the 
stranger’s arms would be gratuitously to allow this person 
to lose an arm. And to allow a great harm to occur when 
one could prevent it without the slightest cost is clearly 
wrong.11
Of course, there is a disanalogy in that, in Parfit’s case, there is ap-
parently no reason to not save the stranger’s other arm once you save 
one, whereas in Drinking while plugged in, there may be a small reason to 
go ahead and drink, if that is what you want to do. But of course, the 
reason in that case is small enough as to not matter much in compari-
son with the severe impairment one inflicts on the violinist.12
So: by way of Hendricks’ impairment principle, if it is wrong to 
cause FAS, then it is also wrong to procure an abortion, unless there 
is some relevant moral difference between the two. I suggest that this 
is an important moral difference: carrying an unwanted pregnancy 
to term is extremely burdensome, whereas refraining from exces-
sive drinking for nine months is, by comparison, not very burden-
some. What does this imply about the prospects for the impairment 
argument?
Suppose the foetus is a person. Return to Thomson’s case. One 
way to resist Thomson’s pro-choice conclusion is to reject the popular 
judgment about the violinist case and to say that I am obligated to stay 
plugged in after all. Another is to search for a disanalogy with the vio-
linist case: perhaps it is different because, say, pregnancy usually re-
sults from a voluntary action on the part of the mother that she knew 
had some chance of resulting in pregnancy, or because abortion in-
volves killing while unplugging merely involves letting die, or because 
the violinist is a stranger whereas the foetus is one’s offspring. 
Obviously, it is controversial whether these methods of resisting 
9 See, for example, Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2003). Consequentialism. In Stanford 
encyclopedia of philosophy, Section 6. Retrieved from https ://plato.stanf ord.edu/entri es/
conse quent ialis m/ [Accessed Jul 19, 2019].
10 Parfit, D. (1982). Future generations: Further problems. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 11, 
113–172, p. 131.
11 McMahan, J. (2015). Doing good and doing the best, p. 3. Retrieved from http://jeffe 
rsonm cmahan.com/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2012/11/Doing-Good-Doing-the-Best.pdf 
[Accessed Jul 19, 2019].
12 Chan, R., & Crummett, D. (2019). Moral indulgences: When offsetting is wrong. Oxford 
Studies in Philosophy of Religion, 9, 68–95.
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Thomson’s argument succeed.13 Apart from the killing/letting die ob-
jection, which I discuss in the next section, I will not attempt to evalu-
ate whether they do. What I want to claim here is just that if one was 
otherwise sympathetic to Thomson’s argument, one has little reason 
to worry about the impairment argument. The difference in burden-
someness provides an easy way of resisting the inference to the 
wrongness of abortion by way of the impairment argument.
Now suppose that the foetus is not a person. In that case, my 
own inclination is to say that even if one or more of the objections 
to Thomson’s argument do work on the supposition that the foe-
tus is a person, they do not work on the supposition that it is not. 
I think it really is pretty clear that a burden equivalent to an un-
wanted pregnancy would be too great for me to be obligated to 
bear it to keep a non-person organism alive, even if I am obligated 
to do so for the violinist. And I think the same is generally true 
even if I voluntarily did something that I knew had a small chance 
of creating this organism in a state of dependence on me, and so 
on. So, if the foetus is not a person, I think it is fairly clear that the 
burdensomeness of an unwanted pregnancy justifies an abortion. 
But refraining from drinking is much less burdensome, and so does 
not justify causing FAS.
3  | C AUSING AND ALLOWING 
IMPAIRMENT
There is another feature of Drinking while plugged in that might seem to 
make it worse than unplugging in Thomson’s case. In Thomson’s case, I 
allow the violinist to suffer a bad fate (by withdrawing support), but in 
Drinking while plugged in, I directly cause the violinist’s impairment by 
drinking. One might think the latter is worse. I framed Drinking while 
plugged in as a case of causing impairment to make it analogous to 
drinking while pregnant, which also directly causes an impairment 
when it results in FAS. But it is also in this way more like abortion than 
Thomson’s original case, since abortion generally does kill the foetus, 
rather than simply withdrawing support from its mother’s body and 
allowing it to die. This mirrors a classic criticism of Thomson’s violinist 
analogy: namely, that unplugging the violinist merely lets him die, while 
abortion directly kills the foetus, which is worse.14
Of course, this would not show that the difference in demand-
ingness is not a morally important difference between unplugging 
and drinking while plugged in. However, it might show that the 
difference is not as important as I claimed, if much of the dif-
ference between the cases is instead explained by the causing/
allowing impairment distinction. If much of the difference is ex-
plained by this distinction, and if abortion is ordinarily, in this re-
spect, more like Drinking while plugged in than like unplugging, this 
might call into question whether the burdensomeness of carrying 
a pregnancy can justify procuring an abortion. This might seem es-
pecially compelling in light of the objection presented in the next 
section, which directly targets what I say about the significance of 
burdensomeness.
My response is that the causing/allowing impairment difference 
is not very morally important here, which can be seen by altering 
Drinking while plugged in to eliminate it. Consider:
Malfunction: As before, I am plugged into the vio-
linist. I willingly stay plugged in for nine months, and 
then down eight shots of liquor an hour before the 
unplugging, with the result that the violinist devel-
ops an FAS-like impairment. However, in this case, 
the mechanism by which the violinist develops the 
impairment is different. No alcohol enters the violin-
ist’s system. Instead, the alcohol causes the machine 
connecting us to temporarily shut down, resulting 
in the build up of a toxin produced by the violinist’s 
own body that would otherwise have been filtered by 
my kidneys. Had I waited an hour, the violinist’s own 
kidneys would have recovered and there would be no 
threat.
In this case, my drinking works, mechanically speaking, more 
like unplugging. It interferes with the medical equipment so that I 
fail to provide aid that would prevent an impairment, rather than 
directly causing an impairment myself.15 However, it seems clear to 
me that drinking in the modified case is as, or almost as, wrong as in 
the ordinary Drinking while plugged in. So modifying the case intro-
duces a disanalogy with drinking while pregnant. I now allow, rather 
than directly cause, the impairment. But this disanalogy does not 
seem to make a substantial moral difference. So the causing/allow-
ing impairment distinction cannot be the main reason why drinking 
while plugged in is morally worse than unplugging the violinist, 
since the moral difference between the cases is about the same 
even if we eliminate the causing/allowing disanalogy. Of course, it 
does not follow that the causing/allowing harm distinction never 
makes a substantial moral difference, which might seem an implau-
sible result. It may be that the relative unimportance of the distinc-
tion here is dependent upon special features of this case.16 
Whatever the reason, I take it as fairly clear that there is not a sub-
stantial moral difference between Drinking while plugged in and 
Malfunction.
Endorsing the causing/allowing distinction as the main expla-
nation of the difference between Drinking while plugged in and 
Thomson’s case would also have awkward consequences for the 
proponent of the impairment argument. As David Boonin notes:
13 See Boonin, D. (2002). A defense of abortion. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University 
Press, Chapter 4.
14 See Boonin, op. cit., pp. 188–211.
15 If we want to claim that drinking in the modified case still directly causes, rather than 
merely allows, an impairment, then I imagine we will have to say the same about 
unplugging the violinist, so that there is never any disanalogy to begin with. See Boonin, 
op. cit., p. 195.
16 See Boonin, op. cit., pp. 199–211.
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…there is at least one method of abortion, hysterotomy, 
that is more plausibly described as a case of letting die 
rather than a case of killing. Hysterotomy involves remov-
ing the living fetus through an abdominal incision of the 
uterus and then allowing it to die. This procedure is more 
invasive and more dangerous to the woman than are other 
procedures, and for this reason it is typically reserved for 
later stages of pregnancy when other techniques are no 
longer feasible. But there is no reason in principle why it 
could not be performed much earlier, if other methods 
were thought for some reason to be morally 
impermissible.17
This puts the proponent of the impairment argument in an infelici-
tous position, if they claim that the main disanalogy between unplug-
ging and Drinking while plugged in comes from the causing/allowing 
impairment distinction. For if the fact that one is causing the impair-
ment in Drinking while plugged in is a very important difference be-
tween that and unplugging, then it will also be a very important 
difference between causing FAS and procuring an abortion via hys-
terotomy. The impairment argument then might not really an argument 
against abortion as such; it might instead just be an argument that any 
abortions need to be performed via a more dangerous and invasive 
procedure.18 Further, Boonin argues at length that, if abortion via hys-
terotomy is permissible, then, given that other methods impose an ad-
ditional cost on the mother and given certain other special features of 
the case, abortion via other methods that directly kill the foetus will be 
permissible, too.19 If the impairment argument leaves abortion via hys-
terotomy untouched, then Boonin’s line of reasoning may provide a 
way of resisting its conclusion even about other abortion cases.
4  | THE REL ATIVIT Y OF DEMANDINGNESS
I have conducted this discussion on the assumption that an unwanted 
pregnancy is far more burdensome than refraining from excessive 
drinking for nine months. While this is no doubt true, it is not nec-
essarily true. In light of this, someone might offer the following 
objection:
You suggest that the greater demandingness of car-
rying an unwanted pregnancy to term, as opposed 
to refraining from drinking for nine months, is a 
morally important difference—one great enough to 
justify procuring an abortion, but not causing FAS. 
But it is not necessarily true that refraining from 
drinking during pregnancy is more demanding. We 
can imagine, say, a severe alcoholic, or someone 
whose identity and leisure time are structured en-
tirely around drinking fancy wines and craft beers, 
or around going to wild parties. Suppose the im-
pact of temporarily giving up drinking on this per-
son’s ability to fulfil their desires and enjoy their 
life equals that typically involved in carrying an un-
wanted pregnancy to term. If the demandingness of 
pregnancy can justify inflicting the impairment of 
death, the demandingness of not drinking could, for 
this person, justify inflicting the lesser impairment 
of FAS. But it would be absurd and perverse to say 
that causing FAS is morally permissible as long as 
you are a severe enough alcoholic, or a dedicated 
enough wine snob or party animal.
There are at least six things to say about this objection.
The first is the least important. I never claimed that the differ-
ence in burdensomeness is the only morally relevant difference be-
tween abortion and causing FAS. In fact, I think it is not. So I am 
not committed to claiming that causing FAS would be permissible if 
avoiding it was sufficiently burdensome. However, I do want the ac-
count I have presented here to be able to stand on its own, without 
needing there to be other disanalogies in order to avoid implausible 
consequences. So I will not rely on this point in what follows.
Second: note that this is not a special problem for my account 
of the relative moral status of abortion and causing FAS, as long 
as we agree that burdensomeness sometimes means that we are 
not obligated to do certain things that we would otherwise be ob-
ligated to do. For instance, suppose we hold the common view that 
we are sometimes obligated to help others when we can achieve 
a very great benefit for little cost to ourselves, but that we are 
not obligated to devote every spare penny and moment to help-
ing those in need, because of how demanding that would be. An 
objector could ask us to consider a rich person who is so greedy 
that giving away even a cent is extremely demanding for them, 
claim that the view commits us to saying that this person has no 
obligation to do so, and then claim that it is perverse to think that 
we are ordinarily required to do something for others, but not if 
we are greedy enough. Most readers will agree that there is some 
satisfactory response to this objection. Whatever that response, I 
suspect it will also work for my account here. For the rest of this 
section I will give my own view about why this objection fails, but 
even if my view does not work, most of us are committed to think-
ing that some view does.
So: on to the question of why the objection actually does fail. 
Consider a third point, which requires that we return to the question 
that I briefly noted in the last section about the exact determinants of 
‘demandingness’. The objection as I have expressed it assumes that the 
17 Boonin, op. cit., p.193.
18 Hendricks realizes that not all abortions directly cause impairment. Though he 
sometimes says simply that his conclusion is that ‘having an abortion is immoral’, at other 
times he says that ‘abortion (in most cases) amounts to killing the fetus’ and that the 
conclusion of the impairment argument is that ‘abortion (in most cases) is immoral’ 
(Hendricks, op. cit., p. 245). When he is speaking in the qualified way, I am not sure what 
his response is to the worries I express in the main text. Presumably, he would not really 
be content with showing only that abortion is immoral, if not done via hysterotomy (cf. 
Boonin, op. cit., p. 189, fn. 41).
19 Boonin, op. cit., pp. 199–211.
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sole factors determining how demanding something is, in the sense rel-
evant to whether I am obligated to do it, depend in some way on my 
subjective mental states—on how much the action would frustrate my 
ability either to satisfy my desires or enjoy my life. But this is not obvi-
ous. I think that a more promising account might appeal, for instance, 
to something like the notion of ‘personal reasons’ defended by Scanlon. 
Such reasons ‘have to do with the claims and status of individuals in 
certain positions’, where the individual, in this case, is the agent from 
whom something is being demanded.20 Scanlon defends the view that 
we can have such personal reasons apart from desire-based or hedonic 
considerations.21 And within his moral theory, it is the strength of 
these reasons that determines how demanding, in the relevant sense, 
an action is, since it is the strength of my personal reasons against per-
forming an action that determines whether I could reasonably reject 
moral principles obligating me to do it.22 It may be that I have reasons 
for objecting to the invasive and incapacitating use of my body by the 
violinist besides just the hindrance it poses to the satisfaction of my 
desires or my enjoyment of my life, without there being comparable 
reasons for objecting to an interruption in my drinking. So, suppose 
that the cost to an individual of refraining from alcohol for nine months, 
as measured by desire satisfaction and hedonic level, is as great as that 
involved in carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term. It would not fol-
low that refraining from alcohol was as demanding, in the morally rele-
vant sense, for that individual.
Of course, it seems plausible that among the personal reasons 
we have are reasons to pursue enjoyment and the satisfaction of our 
desires, and to avoid misery and the frustration of our desires. And 
perhaps such reasons could always, in principle, outweigh any other 
reasons to object to the invasive and burdensome use of one’s body 
by the violinist. So perhaps we can simply stipulate that for the indi-
vidual in the example, the cost of giving up alcohol, as measured by 
desire satisfaction and hedonic level, would be much, much greater 
than the typical cost of carrying an unwanted pregnancy, measured 
the same way. This is fine, as far as it goes. But it will make some of 
the following points more powerful.
Fourth: the case we are being asked to imagine is highly un-
usual, and it is important to make sure that our intuitions are really 
being responsive to the highly unusual nature of the case. Carrying 
an unwanted pregnancy can be very burdensome, much more bur-
densome than giving up drinking for nine months would be for any 
ordinary person.23 There is a risk that, in considering the case, we 
are really imagining what refraining from drinking would be like 
for, say, someone we know who is just really into parties, and 
thereby underrepresenting the burdensomeness that the objector 
stipulates is supposed to be involved. This is especially true if, in 
response to the previous point, we further stipulate that the cost 
to desire satisfaction and enjoyment is much, much greater than 
that typically involved in carrying an unwanted pregnancy. I think 
it is extremely difficult to imagine what a person for whom this 
was true would have to be like. Below, I will alter the imagined 
scenario in a way that I think makes it easier for our intuitions to be 
responsive in the right way.
Fifth, the case the objector is asking us to imagine involves other 
relevant considerations that make it disanalogous from the abortion 
case. Realistically, the severe alcoholic probably has decisive reasons 
to stop drinking anyway, even apart from the effect on the violinist. 
This may not be true of the party animal or wine snob. But their cases 
raise issues analogous to the classic ‘problem of expensive tastes’ 
from the distributive justice literature. The problem of expensive 
tastes is, roughly, the problem of when and to what extent the fact 
that one person needs more resources to enjoy the same level of 
well-being as other people can justify diverting extra resources to 
them. Such diversion sometimes seems justified and sometimes it 
does not. Suppose I have a chronic pain condition and need a special 
medicine to achieve an ordinary level of well-being. Suppose you are 
a dedicated coffee snob, despising normal drinks, and need Kona cof-
fee imported from Hawaii to achieve an ordinary level of well-being. 
The cost to me of not having the medicine is the same as the cost to 
you of not having the Kona coffee. Under normal conditions, it seems 
more justifiable for the government to spend extra money on me to 
provide the medicine than to spend extra money on you to provide 
the coffee, even if the medicine and coffee are equally expensive. The 
exact reasons why are controversial, but it is not too hard to identify 
clear-cut cases where diverting resources seems justifiable and where 
it does not.24
The objection here raises an analogous problem: under what 
circumstances does the fact that an action is more demanding for 
one person excuse them from doing it, when doing it would be 
obligatory for an ordinary person? Again, the answer seems to be 
that they will be excused in some circumstances and not in others. 
I think the cases of the wine snob or the party animal will, under 
realistic conditions, be circumstances where there is not much ex-
cusatory force. We would tell them that they needed to toughen 
up, to find ways of enjoying their lives that did not depend on al-
cohol. And I think this is part of why the objection, as I initially 
framed it, might seem compelling. The party animal and the wine 
snob are not excused, and if my account implied that they are, 
this would be a problem. But my account does not imply that they 
are excused. Their not being excused does not show that burden-
someness could not excuse drinking; it instead shows (among the 
other things I have mentioned) that not drinking, for them, is bur-
densome in the special, non-excusatory way. In the next paragraph, 
I will alter the scenario so that the burdensomeness of not drink-
ing is not due to the intuitively non-excusatory kind of expensive 
taste.
20 Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, p. 219.
21 Ibid: Chapter 1.
22 Ibid: Chapter 5.
23 For a discussion of the burdensomeness of pregnancy (and how it compares with the 
burdensomeness of staying hooked up to the violinist), see Boonin, op. cit., pp. 236–241, 
esp. pp. 239–240.
24 See, for example, Cohen, G. A. (1989). On the currency of egalitarian justice. Ethics, 99, 
906–944; Cohen, G. A. (2004). Expensive taste rides again. In J. Burley (Ed.), Ronald 
Dworkin and his critics (pp. 3–29). Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell.
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Finally, point six: suppose we take the previous three lessons 
on board. We are confident that we really have described a case 
where refraining from alcohol is as burdensome as carrying an un-
wanted pregnancy, we are confident that we really are accounting 
for this fact in our intuitions, and we have constructed the case 
so as to avoid morally confounding factors. If we really do this, 
the conclusion that I am permitted to drink no longer seems like 
a counterexample to me. Suppose I am hooked up to the violinist 
in Thomson’s case. However, in this variant, I have a rare, con-
genital, otherwise untreatable medical condition that is such that, 
if I do not occasionally drink some liquor, I will be stricken with 
excruciating and incapacitating fits of pain. (One can adjust the 
frequency and severity of these fits until the demandingness of 
not drinking for nine months seems comparable to that of carrying 
an unwanted pregnancy.) If I do drink, the violinist will develop an 
FAS-like impairment. Staying plugged in and drinking will nonethe-
less be better for him than unplugging and letting him die, which, 
we can suppose for purposes of argument, I would be permitted to 
do. For some reason I am unable to communicate with him about 
any of this—for instance, I cannot ask whether he would consent to 
my staying plugged in and drinking. I am willing to save his life, and 
I stay plugged in. Am I now also obligated to refrain from drinking 
at the cost of the incapacitating fits of excruciating pain? I doubt 
it. So: as far as the explanation of the difference between abor-
tion and causing FAS that I have presented here goes, if refraining 
from drinking really was as burdensome as carrying an unwanted 
pregnancy, drinking might not be wrong. But once we account for 
all the difficulties involved in imagining a scenario like this, the 
 implication is not a problem for the account. It is the intuitive 
result.
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